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I.

ARGUMENT

The Respondents' Brief ignores the law that informs the findings of fact the district court
was required to make to support the conclusions it reached. Respondents argue to this Court that
the issues on appeal are simply factual and that the district court's findings were supported by
substantial and competent evidence because the evidence at trial was disputed. However, the
Respondents, much like the district court, ignore the law that dictates what facts are relevant to
the outcome of the case. The Respondents also improperly raise additional issues on appeal that
were required to be raised as a cross-appeal, and which have no factual or legal support.
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT RUTH SMITH HAD AUTHORITY TO CALL A SPECIAL
MEETING

Respondents frame this issue as simply a "factual challenge[] to the District Court's
findings of fact on disputed evidence." Respondents' Brief, p. 8.

Based on that assertion,

Respondents contend "Appellants' arguments simply invite this Court to second guess the trial
court's factual findings" and Respondents rely upon a standard of review that is deferential to the
findings of the lower court. Respondents' Brief, p. 8, 14. However, Respondents ignore the
requirements of Idaho statute that dictate the findings necessary to support the trial court's
conclusion that Ruth Smith had authority to call a special meeting. The trial court erred as a
matter of law when it concluded that Ruth Smith had authority to call a special meeting because
neither Kemmer or Dolph tendered written resignations, or were removed as board members.
1.

Applicable Standard of Review

On appeal an Appellant is required to present a list of issues on appeal, which "statement
of issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein."
1.A.R. 35(a)(4). The first issue presented by Appellants (hereinafter "Kemmer") was "Did the
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district court err by concluding that Ruth Smith had authority to call a special meeting?"
Opening Brief, p. 10. That issue statement fairly comprised the following subsidiary issues:
whether the district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that: 1) Kemmer and Dolph
could resign without tendering a written resignation, and 2) Kemmer and Dolph could be deemed
removed as board members without an affirmative act of the Board and/or its members. These
issues are not merely factual issues, but are conclusions of law over which this Court exercises
free review. Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2013). Thus, in
this appeal the Court freely reviews whether the district court applied the correct legal standard
when it held that Kemmer and Dolph had resigned as directors.
2.

Resignation or Removal of a Director

The Idaho Non-Profit Corporation Act ("the Act") requires a written resignation from a
director before a resignation is official: "A director may resign at any time by delivering written
notice to the board of directors, its presiding officer or to the president or secretary." I.C. § 30-3-

69 (emphasis added). 1 The purpose of the statute is clear. It prevents other individuals from
claiming a Director has resigned based upon disputed oral statements as is the case with Duane
Kemmer. It also prevents an inference of resignation based upon the lack of holding a meeting,
which is the argument Respondents advance with respect to Tim Dolph.
Despite the clear requirement of the statute, the Respondents argue that the Act "does not
specify that resignations be in writing, but merely by 'delivering notice to the corporation."'
However, Respondents cite to the statute discussing resignation by officers not the statute
discussing resignation by directors. Compare I.C. §§ 30-3-69 and 30-3-86. The district court

1

In 2015 the Act was recodified at Chapter 30 of Title 30 of the Idaho Code. However, the version applicable to the
events of this appeal is the prior version codified at Chapter 3 of Title 30 of the Idaho Code.
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erred when it held that Duane Kemmer and Tim Dolph resigned when neither tendered a written
resignation.
Any actions taken in violation of the Act and/or governing corporate documents are void
as a matter oflaw. See Twin Lakes Vil!. Prop. Ass'n v. Aune, 124 Idaho 132,857 P.2d 611 (1993)
(amendments made to bylaws in violation of the procedure required by the bylaws were void and
action based on improper amendment was also void); Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho
271, 353 P.2d 406 (1960) (sale of treasury stock was void because it was contrary to articles of
incorporation and bylaws); Glahe v. Arnett, 38 Idaho 736,741,225 P. 796, 798 (1924) (election
of new directors and officers at an improperly called stockholders' special meeting was void).
The trial court concluded that Kemmer and Dolph resigned and/or were removed as
board members. To reach such a conclusion, the trial court must have evidence that they either
tendered written resignations or were removed according to the Act or the Bylaws. However,
there was no such evidence at trial, and Respondents were unable to support the trial court's
conclusion with any reference to evidence at trial.
A corporation's bylaws can change or modify certain requirements and standards of the
Act. LC. § 30-1-206. The Act allows for removal of directors by various methods depending
upon the circumstances by which that director was originally placed on the Board. See LC. §§
30-3-70 and 30-3-71. In this instance, the NLM Bylaws control removal and allow removal ofa
director by unanimous vote of the other directors. Trial Exhibit 30, p. 3. § 6. There was no
evidence at trial that either Kemmer or Dolph were removed by the other directors. Ruth Smith
testified Tim Dolph forfeited his position on the board of directors by making a statement with
which she disagreed. Tr p. 315, L. 13 -p. 316, L. 13; p. 317, L. 10-14. Another letter sent to
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Dolph indicated he was removed from his position due to a conflict of interest (although there
was no Board meeting held at which the Board members voted for his removal). Trial Exhibit E.
The NLM Bylaws do not even mention director resignation and do not alter the statutory
requirement that directors resign by written notice. 2 See Trial Exhibit 30, Art. II. The only
evidence at trial was that Kemmer allegedly gave an oral notice of resignation. Tr p. 381, L. 612; p. 513, L. 9-18; p. 523, L. 2- p. 525, L. 15. The trial testimony was that Kemmer expressed
his frustration with the chaos within the church and stated to more than one member on more
than one occasion in casual conversation he did not want to be on the board anymore because of
the turmoil. Tr p. 588, L. 19 - p. 586, L. 1; p. 587, L. 25 - p. 588, L. 7; p. 523, L. 2 - p. 525, L.
15. There was no evidence that either Kemmer or Dolph resigned in writing or were removed as
board members. To the contrary, the undisputed trial testimony was there was never any written
resignations provided by either of them. Tr p. 587, L. 22-24; p. 522, L. 21 - p. 523, L. l; p. 272,
L. 3-14.

There was no evidence that Duane Kemmer ever provided a written notice of

resignation and despite his displeasure with the chaos in the church, the evidence shows he
continued to attend and participate in board meetings, including the last aborted board meeting in
May. Trp.105,L. ll-p.110,L. 6;p. 310,L. 12-22;p. 338,L.10-p. 341,L. 3.
3.

The Trial Court's Findings Do Not Satisfy Idaho Code or the Bylaws

The evidence at trial was undisputed that in early 2010 the NLM Board consisted of three
(3) directors: Kemmer, Dolph, and Smith. Trial Exhibit 12; Tr p. 178, L. 23 - p. 179, L. 23; p.
211, L. 19 - p. 217, L. 25; p. 244, L. 23 - p. 245, L. 4; p. 446, L. 22 - p. 447, L. 1; p. 572, L. 813. Following trial, the district court concluded "by mid-July 2010 ... Ruth Smith was the only
remaining Board member." R p. 84, L. 13-16. According to the Act and the Bylaws, the only
2

Respondents argue that "the Bylaws do not require written resignation, just advance notice. Clerk's Ex., Pl. 's Ex.
30, P. 5, Section 5." Respondents' Brief, 9. However the section of the Bylaws cited by the Respondents pertains to
officers, not directors. Compare Trial Exhibit 30, Art. II discussing directors.
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way the district court's conclusion/findings could be correct is if there was evidence of either
resignation and/or removal of Kemmer and Dolph by mid-July 2010.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that either Kemmer or Dolph were removed
as directors by mid-July 2010. Similarly, there is no finding by the district court that either was
removed by that time. Therefore, the only way either of those positions could have been vacant
by mid-July as found by the district court was by resignation. Yet there is no evidence in the
record that either Kemmer or Dolph tendered written resign~tions.
The trial testimony was clear that neither tendered a written resignation. Tr p. 587, L. 2224; p. 522, L. 21 - p. 523, L. 1; p. 272, L. 3-14; p. 245, L. 17-19. Despite a total lack of
evidence of resignation under the Act the district court concluded that Kemmer and Dolph
resigned verbally and/or by absenting themselves from meetings. R p. 84, L. 13-16.
First and foremost, the district court's conclusion that Kemmer and Dolph resigned
verbally or through absenteeism is an erroneous conclusion of law. Neither the district court, nor
the Respondents cite to any law that allows a director to resign by voicing frustration or
discontent with one's position or "absenting" themselves from unspecified meetings. 3 The Act is
clear that director resignation requires "delivering written notice." J.C. § 30-3-69. The district
court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that a resignation could occur through voicing
frustration or by missing meetings.

4.

Prior Resignation without a Writing Doesn't Change the Statutory
Requirement

Without providing the Court any authority to support their position, the Respondents
argue that a written resignation was not required within NLM because one resignation was

3

In fact, Respondents in their brief acknowledge there was no Board meetings between the aborted meeting in May
and August I. Respondent's Brief, page I. It is confusing how the district court concluded a Board member was
removed from the board member's position for not attending a meeting that did not occur.
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accepted in the past without a writing. Respondents' Brief, 9. Respondents cite to Alan Kirk's
testimony that he resigned as a director orally without a writing. Tr p. 84, L. 8-15. However,
Alan Kirk's failure to tender a proper resignation in 2007 did not rewrite the Act or its
requirement that a resignation be in writing. There is also evidence in the record that historically
NLM did follow the statutory requirements for director resignation, like when Ken Ewing
resigned by written resignation. Tr p. 237, L. 6- p. 128, L. 6.
Respondents argue that following the Act and the letter of the law requiring resignations
to be in writing allows directors to defect or absent themselves from director meetings without a
mechanism for the corporation to continue without them. Respondents' Brief, 10. Respondents
do not provide any authority that this Court may ignore the law if it creates undesirable results in
some circumstances.
Further, this argument is unpersuasive because under both the Act and the Bylaws the
corporation has mechanisms to remove those directors, without the defecting directors
effectively holding the corporation hostage. See I.C. §§ 30-3-70 (removal of elected directors)
and 30-3-71 (removal of designated or appointed directors); Trial Exhibit 30, NLM Bylaws, p. 3.
§ 6 (removal by unanimous vote of remaining directors). The district court erred as a matter of
law when it found that Kemmer and Dolph resigned absent any written resignation from either.
The district court erred in holding that Smith was the sole remaining Board member, and as such
had authority to call a special meeting. Therefore, the district court's conclusion was not based
on findings of fact supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT IGNORED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BYLAWS
WHEN IT FOUND THAT BOB NEWMAN WAS APPOINTED SENIOR PASTOR
ON MARCH 28, 2010

The district court erred in finding that Newman was appointed as senior pastor because it
ignored the requirements of the Bylaws and never made the findings required by the Bylaws.
According to the NLM Bylaws, the senior pastor "shall be the president of this corporation and
shall act as chairman of all business meetings of the voting membership and the board of
directors." Trial Exhibit 30, p. 4, § 2(1 ). The Bylaws also prescribe the mechanism to fill a
vacancy in the senior pastor position:
Section 4. Vacancy: In the event of a vacancy in the senior pastorate, a pastor
shall be selected in the following manner:
1.
The board of directors shall immediately convene and assign one
of the associate pastors as a temporary replacement for the
senior pastor.
2.
A roster of candidates shall be presented to the board of directors
for review of their scriptural qualifications. Upon acceptance of
qualification, each candidate will present themselves to the voting
membership.
3.
After the voting membership has had an opportunity to review all
candidates set forth by the board of directors, a special meeting
will be called and a vote will be taken, with a majority vote
required for the final appointment of the new senior pastor.

Trial Exhibit 30, Art. II, § 4 (emphasis added). Therefore, according to the Bylaws a senior
pastor cannot be appointed without first holding a special meeting and having a vote for the
appointment of that senior pastor.
The district court ignored the requirements of the Bylaws for appointing a senior pastor
and simply concluded that the Board's inquiry into Bob Newman's interest in being pastor was
his appointment as senior pastor: "Once the Board appointed Bob Newman on March 28, 2010,
as pastor, he succeeded to the 'Senior Pastor' role according to the Bylaws and, therefore, was
President ofNLM." R p. 86, L. 2-3; compare Trial Exhibit M, March 28 minutes (minutes state
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"[a]nd ask Bob Newman if he would be interested in being the pastor and he said he would be
interested in being the pastor"); Tr p. 496, L. 2-3 (Ms. Newman testified she remembered her
husband being asked ifhe was interested in being the senior pastor).
The district court failed to find that Newman was appointed as senior pastor following a
majority vote of the members. Indeed, the testimony at trial was undisputed that there was no
vote on March 28, 2010, to even appoint him as senior pastor. Tr p. 518, L. 7 - p. 519, L. 5.
Rather, the substantial and competent evidence reveals the Board appointed him as the temporary
pastor.
Respondents ask this Court to uphold the district court's conclusion/finding that Newman
was appointed as senior pastor by the Board on March 28, 20 I 0, arguing that the evidence at trial
of Newman's title and position was disputed "but amply supports the Trial Court's findings."
Respondents' Brief, 15. However, the Respondents ignore the conditions precedent required by
the Bylaws before a senior pastor can be appointed: first, there must be a temporary appointment
· of a pastor by the Board (which is what occurred when Newman and Quinn were appointed
temporary pastors); second, there must first be a slate of candidates prepared by the Board of
Directors for presentment to the members for vote; and third, there must be a special meeting of
the members where the candidate who received the majority vote is to be appointed the new

senior pastor.

That is the argument set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 16-20, and

Respondents' Brief fails to address that argument. Respondents' simply ask this Court to accept
the trial court's findings, which were based on Newman's belief that he had been appointed by
the Board as the new senior pastor despite the fact that the membership had not voted. However,
belief of appointment is not what the Bylaws require. The district court ignored the Bylaw
requirements for appointment of a senior pastor and accordingly, its findings are not supported
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by substantial and competent evidence that satisfies the requirements of the Bylaws. The district
court's finding that Newman was appointed as senior pastor is clearly erroneous and should be
reversed.

C.

THE STANDING AND WAIVER ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE DISREGARDED
BY THIS COURT
The district court did not determine the standing or waiver issues below because it

determined those issues were moot. R p. 86. Appellants never raised standing or waiver as
issues on appeal.

Respondents did not cross-appeal on those issues pursuant to I.A.R. 15.

Instead Respondents assert the issues of standing and waiver are alternative grounds upon which
the district court's decision is based. However, this assertion is wrong.
If the respondent on appeal "seeks to change or add to the relief afforded below" it must

file a cross-appeal. Walker v. Shoshone Cty., 112 Idaho 991,993, 739 P.2d 290,292 (1987).
Indeed, Idaho Appellate Rule 15 requires a cross-appeal if "modification of the judgment or
order" is sought by the Respondent. "If the respondent does not cross-appeal then the issues are
not properly before this Court and will not be considered." State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 763,
241 P.3d I, 6 (Ct. App. 2010) citing Miller v. Bd. a/Trustees, 132 Idaho 244,248,970 P.2d 512,
516 (1998).

It is well established in Idaho law that "when a decision is based upon alternative
grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be
disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds." Andersen v. Prof!
Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) (internal citations omitted). For
instance, if an appellant challenges a district court's decision on only one of two alternative
grounds for the decision, even if reversal is warranted on the ground appealed, the appeal must
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be dismissed because it failed to address the alternative ground for relief relied upon by the
district court. Id.
In this case, the Respondents failed to cross-appeal the district court's decision to change
the relief provided them by the final decision. The Respondents' standing and waiver issues are
attempts to have this Court modify the lower court's Memorandum Decision because that
decision did not make the determination that standing or waiver supported the final judgment.
Instead the Respondents argue that the issues of standing and waiver are "alternative grounds" to
support the district court's memorandum decision and final order. That is simply not true.
Those issues were not addressed by the district court because it determined they were moot. R p.
86. Therefore, these are not alternative grounds for the district court's decision or final order
below. These issues should be disregarded by the Court because they were not properly crossappealed and do not qualify as alternative grounds for the final judgment.

If this Court does entertain the Respondents' arguments that the Appellants lacked
standing and/or waived their right to bring suit, it should determine that neither of these
arguments is supported by the law or the record.

1.

The Appellants Have Standing

Respondents claim that the Appellants have improperly filed a derivative action against
the corporation, but that claim is not supported by fact or law. The action filed before the trial
court was an action for declaratory judgment, under which the Appellants have standing.
Furthermore, the record does not support Respondents' argument that the Appellants are no
longer members ofNLM.
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a.

Declaratory Action

The Complaint in this action was a complaint for declaratory judgment brought pursuant
Title 10, Chapter 12 of the Idaho Code to declare Plaintiffs' rights to continue in their board
positions despite the August 1, 2010, meeting that purportedly removed them. R p. 19-23.
Indeed the relief sought was "a declaration that plaintiffs are the Board of directors ofNLM with
authority to exercise all powers as designated in the Idaho Nonprofit Corporation Act and the
bylaws of the corporation." R p. 21.
This case is not a shareholder's derivative lawsuit and is not brought on behalf of the
corporation. The Complaint makes that clear. R p. 19-23. However, even if the Court is inclined
to classify this action under the Idaho Non-Profit Corporation Act, it must conclude that the
action is an individual action since the injury alleged is specific to the Appellants as individuals.
This Court has held that an action is individual, rather than derivative, if the injury alleged is
"specific to the shareholder." McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809,814,275 P.3d 824,829
(2012). The Appellants have alleged that they have been ousted (the injury) from their positions
as Board members. R p. 19-23. That is an injury that is specific to the individuals. Thus, this
action is not derivative, and Appellants have standing before the Court.
Indeed, as cited by Respondents, the essence of the standing inquiry is whether the
Appellants have alleged a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the action. Miles v. Idaho
Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Appellants certainly have a personal

stake in their positions within a governing body that has been improperly taken from them.

b.

No Evidence ofa Loss of Membership

The district court made no finding that the Appellants lost their membership with NLM.
There is also no evidence in the record of the conditions precedent required for loss of
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membership with NLM. The Bylaws ofNLM govern church membership including loss of
membership. There is no dispute that the Appellants were once members ofNLM. However,
Respondents contend that membership was lost.
The Bylaws require specific corporate action before membership in the church can be
lost:

Subsection 2B. Loss of Membership: . Members who shall without good cause
absent themselves from the services of the fellowship for three consecutive
months or more, or who may be out of harmony with its teachings, or who shall
be under charges of misconduct, or who may have fallen into sinful practices,
shall by implementation of the senior pastor and the board of directors, and
by action so stated in the minutes, become a non-voting member and shall lose
any legal standing associated with membership until such time as the affected
member's case has become final.
Trial Exhibit 30, Art. I, § 2B (emphasis added). According to the Bylaws, membership can only
be lost when action is taken by the senior pastor and the board of directors, and that action is
stated in the minutes. The district court did not make that finding and the record does not
support that conclusion. Indeed, the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the
Appellants continued as members of NLM even after the August 1, 2010, meeting as they
continued to hold Board meetings (albeit the other Board was also holding meetings). Trial
Exhibit M, August 9, 2010, Minutes, and August 12, 2010, Minutes. The Appellants also held
themselves out as members to the Idaho Secretary of State. Trial Exhibit M, August 18, 2010,
letter. Therefore, the Appellants have standing.

2.

Appellants Have Not Waived their Right to a Declaratory Judgment

The Appellants' failure to attend the August 1, 20 I 0, special membership meeting was
not a waiver of the Appellants' right to have the court determine whether the actions taken at that
meeting violated the Idaho Non-Profit Corporation Act or the Bylaws. Respondents contend that
waiver generally is "a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and
12

the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that he
thereby has altered his position to his detriment." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,
457-58, 259 P.3d 595, 603-04 (2011). Yet, the Respondents fail to present this Court with any
evidence that they relied upon the Appellants' relinquishment of a known right and altered their

position to their detriment. Similarly, Respondents have failed to provide this Court with any
case law in Idaho that failure to attend and object to a special membership meeting constitutes a
waiver of protest regarding such meeting.
Contrary to the Respondents' position, "[a] member's attendance at ameeting ... [w]aives
objection to lack of notice or defective notice of the meeting, unless the member at the beginning
of the meeting objects to holding the meeting or transacting business at the meeting." LC.§ 303-51(2). While Respondents contend that Appellants' failure to attend the special meeting was a
waiver, the Non-Profit Corporation Act says that their attendance would have been a waiver if
they did not make an objection at the beginning of that meeting. There is no evidence in the
Records that the Respondents altered their position to their detriment in response to the
Appellants' failure to attend the meeting. There is no Idaho law that failure to attend the
membership meeting is a waiver of the right to challenge the illegal actions that took place at the
meeting. Accordingly, the waiver argument should be disregarded by this Court.

D.

RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
Respondents are not entitled to attorneys fees on appeal because the appeal was not

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Pursuant to LC. § 12-121 an award of attorney
fees is subject to the Court's discretion. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289-90, 246 P.3d
391, 398-99 (2010). That statute only allows for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party
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when the appeal "was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,640, 132 P.3d 392,397 (2006).

Appellants contend on appeal that the district court erred as a matter of law when it failed
to properly apply Idaho Code and the Bylaws to the facts presented at trial, and as a result made
conclusions that are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court
failed to apply the applicable law and instead based its conclusions on erroneous legal principles
(e.g. a director can resign by voicing frustration even though the Act requires a written
resignation and another director may forfeit his position by disagreeing with another director or
by absenteeism from meetings, even when no board meetings occurred).

Despite the

Respondents' contentions, this appeal is not just "an invitation to 'second guess' the Trial
Court's findings of fact on conflicting evidence." Respondents' Brief, p. 20. As enunciated
multiple times above, the district court failed to apply the correct law to the evidence presented
at trial, conflicting or otherwise. The Appellants' appeal is based on the existing law at the time
of trial and the bylaws governing the rights and obligations of the parties. Such a challenge is
not frivolous.
II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, as well as those contained within the Appellants'
Opening Brief, the Appellants respectfully request this Court reverse the lower court's final
judgment and declare that Duane Kemmer, Tim Dolph and Ruth Smith are the duly constituted
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Board of Directors of New Life Missions, Inc.
Respectfully submitted this
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day of May, 2016.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
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